Digital signatures are one of the most fundamental primitives in cryptography. In this paper, three new paradigms are proposed to obtain signatures that are secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message attacks (fully-secure, in short), from any weakly-secure signature. These transformations are generic, simple, and provably secure in the standard model. In the first paradigm, based on a weakly-secure signature scheme, the construction of a fully-secure signature scheme requires one-time signature additionally. However, the other two are built only on weakly-secure signatures. To the best of our knowledge, it is observed for the first time in this paper that two weakly-secure signature schemes are sufficient to construct a fully-secure signature scheme.
Introduction
Digital signature plays a central role in cryptography. The standard definition on the security of signature scheme was given by Goldwasser et al. [18] . Compared to the standard security model [18] , there are also many weak security models. In fact, in terms of the goals and resources of the adversary, many security models can be formed. However, signatures in these weak security models, such as existentially unforgeable against generic chosen message attack (or, weak chosen message attack) [5, 18] , are not sufficient in many practical applications. In this paper, the signatures that is secure against weak chosen message attack are called weakly-secure signatures. In this security model, the adversary is required to submit all signature queries before the signer's public key is published.
Obviously, because of the limitation of signature queries, the signature that is provably secure in this weak model will be insecure in many practical applications. There are many attempts to design practical and provably secure signature schemes in the standard security model [18] . These methods can be divided into two categories, namely, concrete construction method and generic construction method.
There are many concrete constructions of signature schemes based on some standard assumptions, such as discrete logarithm problem [28, 30] , computational Diffie-Hellman problem [6, 17, 34] , factoring problem [3] . Some constructions based on other assumptions [29, 36] have also been proposed. Though they are efficient, their security can only be proven in the
Our results
Firstly, we present three new paradigms to transform any weakly-secure signature schemes into fully-secure signature schemes. More precisely, these three paradigms are called sequential composition with one-time signature, sequential composition method, and parallel composition method, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, it is observed for the first time in our paper that only two weakly-secure signature schemes are required to get fully-secure signatures. Therefore, this paper makes contributions towards the goal to obtain efficient constructions with standard assumptions. Motivated from the results of [23] , Huang et al. [21] showed how to construct a strongly unforgeable signature from a weakly secure signature and Li et al. [24] showed two generic construction methods to get an unforgeable signature scheme from a weakly-secure signature scheme. Thus, these results have interest from both theoretical and practical perspective. More specifically, these three paradigms are described as follows:
Sequential composition with one-time signature: This paradigm requires one weak signature scheme and an ordinary one-time signature. Key pair of the weak signature scheme is generated in key generation algorithm and used to sign the public key of one-time signature, which is generated in signing algorithm. Sequential composition (of weak signatures): This paradigm requires two weak signature schemes sequentially. Key pair in the first weak signature scheme is generated in key generation algorithm. During signing algorithm, another key pair of weak signature is generated. The first secret key is used to sign the other public key, and the other secret key is used to sign a message. Parallel composition (of weak signatures): Two weak signature schemes are also required in this paradigm, however, both of their key pairs should be generated in key generation algorithm, and used to sign two random and related messages.
We also show several efficient instantiations without random oracles converted from two weakly-secure signature schemes. The first two paradigm are very efficient in key generation compared to the last. However, the signing algorithm of the last paradigm is more efficient. There is a coincidence that, when instantialized from weak signature scheme [16] , the construction will be similar to twin signature scheme [26] . In fact, the last paradigm can be viewed as generalization and extension of the twin signature scheme [26] . Recently, another notion called strongly existential unforgeability was concerned by many contributions, such as [7, 21, 33 ].
Organization
In Section 2, the definitions of variant signatures are given. Then, two previous instantiations of weakly-secure signature schemes are reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, three generic transformations techniques are proposed. In Section 5, several instantiations from sequential composition with one-time signature scheme are presented. In Section 6, instantiations from sequential composition method are given. In Section 7, we show the two instantiations from parallel composition method. The conclusion is given in Section 8.
In terms of adversary's goals, it can be divided into four categories: (1) Total break: This is the most serious attack, in which the adversary is able to disclose the secret key of the signer; (2) Universal forgery: The adversary is able to sign any given messages; (3) Existential forgery: The adversary is able to provide a signature on a new message whose signature has not been seen; (4) Strong existential forgery: The adversary is able to provide a new message-signature pair.
On the other hand, various resource can be made available to the adversary, helping into his/her forgery. We focus ourselves on two kinds of message attacks: (1) Weakly chosen message attack: The messages chosen by the adversary must be given to the signer before seeing the signer's public key; (2) Adaptively chosen message attack: The adversary is allowed to request signatures of messages chosen by itself.
Unforgeability
The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability under adaptively chosen message attacks (fully-secure signatures) [18] , which is also required in other signature notions such as proxy signature and ring signature [13, 31, 35] . It can be defined through the following game:
Setup: A public/private key pair (pk, sk)
Gen(1 k ) is generated and adversary A is given the public key pk.
Query: A runs for time t and issues q signing queries to a signing oracle in an adaptive manner, that is, for each i; 1 6 i 6 q; A chooses a message m i based on the message-signature pairs that A has already seen, and obtains in return a signature r i on m i from the signing oracle (i.e., r i = Sign(sk, m i )). Definition 1 (Unforgeability). A signature scheme P = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is (t, q, e)-fully-secure, if any adversary with run-time t wins the above game with probability at most e after issuing at most q signing queries.
Strong existential unforgeability
The notion is also defined using the above game between a challenger C and an adversary A, except the definition that ''A wins the game'' is A can output a pair (m
⁄ ) does not belong to the previous queried set {(m i , r i )} and
Weak unforgeability
If we lower the adversary's ability to weak chosen message attack while keeping the goal of the adversary unchanged, we can get a weaker definition compared to existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks. The difference between this security notion with the standard security is that here it requires that the adversary should submit all messages for signature queries before the public key is seen. It is defined through the following game:
Pre-Proceeding: Adversary A runs for time t and issues q signing queries to a signing oracle, i.e., A chooses messages m i , where 1 6 i 6 q. Setup: A public/private key pair (pk, sk)
Gen(1 k ) is generated and adversary A is given the public key pk. Meanwhile, q signatures r i on m i from the signing oracle (i.e., r i = Sign(sk, m i )), are also returned to A. Definition 2 (Weak Unforgeability). A signature scheme P = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is (t, q, e)-weakly-secure, if any adversary with run-time t wins the above game with probability at most e.
Instantiations of weak signatures
It has been shown in [5, 16] that two weakly-secure signature schemes can be constructed, based on the q-SDH assumption and Strong-RSA assumption, respectively, in the standard model.
Weak Boneh-Boyen signature [5]
Before describing the weak Boneh-Boyen signature, we first introduce some preliminaries on bilinear maps and an assumption used in [5] .
Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic groups of prime order p with the multiplicative group action. And, g is a generator of G 1 . Let e : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 be a map with the following properties, (1) Proof. Refer to [5] . h 3.2. Weak GHR signature [16] Gennaro et al. proposed a secure signature scheme [16] (denoted by GHR signature) without random oracle, however, under the assumption that hash function H is division intractable, and acts like the random oracle model or achieves the chameleon property, which was called a non-standard randomness-finding oracle in [16] . Division intractability means that it is computationally impossible to find a 1 , a 2 , . . ., a k and b such that H(b) divides the product of all the H(a i ). In order to get a fully-secure signature without random oracles, the non-standard randomness-finding oracle was required [16] . This nonstandard assumption helps the simulator to find the second preimage during the simulation. The randomness-finding oracle is non-standard because it requires that, given a hash function H, values M and e, one could find a random value R such that H(R, M) = e. In fact, without the assumption of randomness-finding oracle, the simulator has to guess which messages the adversary will ask during the signing simulation phase. This problem was also addressed in [10] .
Definition 4 (Strong-RSA Assumption). Given a randomly chosen RSA modulus n, and a random element s 2 Z Ã n , it is infeasible to find a pair (e, r) with e > 1 such that r e = s (mod n).
We describe the weak GHR signature scheme as follows:
1. Gen: Pick two random safe primes p and q and compute n = pq as RSA modulus. A hash function H and a random value s 2 Z Ã n are selected. The public key is (n, s) and the secret key is (p, q). 2. Sign: To sign a message m, the signer computes e H(m) and outputs the signature as r ¼ s Theorem 2. The weak GHR signature scheme is weakly-secure if the Strong-RSA assumption holds and H is division intractability.
Proof. Refer to [10, 16] h Note that the division-intractable hash functions can be constructed from collision-intractable hash functions [27] .
Fully-secure signatures from weakly-secure signatures
There are two main techniques to get fully-secure signatures from weakly-secure signatures in literature, (1) Random Oracle Model: By using the hash function on the messages for signatures without changing other algorithms, the new signatures can be fully-secure from the back patch property of random oracle [2] . This method was used in [5, 36] ; (2) Chameleon Hash Function: By combining weakly-secure signatures with the chameleon hash function, the signer can first sign any value with the weak signature scheme. Then it can sign the real message from the signature on any value, by using the property of chameleon hash function. Many papers have used this technique, such as [5, 14, 25, 32] .
In this section, three new paradigms are proposed to transform any weakly-secure signature into fully-secure signature.
Sequential composition method with one-time signature
Given a weakly-secure signature scheme P 0 = (Gen 0 , Sign 0 , Verify 0 ), we construct fully-secure signature scheme P = (Gen, Sign, Verify). In the construction, we use a one-time signature scheme OTS ¼ ðOGen; OSign; OVerifyÞ, where OGen, OSign, and OVerify are generating keys algorithm, signing algorithm, and verifying signatures algorithm, respectively.
The construction of P proceeds as follows: Key generation of the resulted fully-secure signature is the same with the key generation of weak signature. So, length of the public key in the fully-secure signature is independent of the one-time signature's public key length. In signature generation phase, Sign 0 (sk, opk) can be pre-computed by the signer. So, online computation in signature generation are only the computation of the one-time signature OTS, which is very efficient. The computation in verification is just the verification computation of P 0 and OTS.
We first give some intuition as to why P is secure against adaptively chosen message attack. Given only weakly-secure signature S 0 and one-time signature OTS, the simulator can answer the adaptively signature queries from adversary because the choose of one-time keys is independent of messages chosen by the adversary, which implies that the one-time public keys can send to S 0 for signatures before messages are given, and then using OTS to sign messages from the adversary.
Let r i = (A i , B i , C i ) be the queried signatures and let r ⁄ = (A ⁄ , B ⁄ , C ⁄ ) be the forged signature on a new message m ⁄ outputted by the adversary. On one hand, if C ⁄ -C i for i = 1, . . ., q S , then it implies that the P 0 is insecure under weak chosen message attack. On the other hand, if C ⁄ = C i for some signature output by the simulator, then B ⁄ is another valid signature with respect to the one-time key C ⁄ , that is to say, the adversary breaks the one-time signature scheme. So, under the assumption that P 0 is weakly-secure and that OTS is secure one-time signature, the signature scheme P is fully-secure.
Below, we formally prove the security of the signature scheme P.
Theorem 3. If P 0 is a weakly-secure signature scheme and OTS is an unforgeable one-time signature scheme, then P is a fullysecure signature scheme.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
Sequential composition method
Given a weakly-secure signature scheme P 0 = (Gen 0 , Sign 0 , Verify 0 ), we construct a fully-secure signature scheme P = (Gen, Sign, Verify) by using the sequential composition method. We assume that the public key space belongs to the message space in this paradigm. Otherwise, hash function or other techniques could be applied here to achieve this. The construction of P proceeds as follows:
Gen. On input security parameter 1 k , invoke Gen 0 (1 k ) and obtain (pk, sk) Gen 0 (1 k ). Output P 0 s public key pk and secret key sk (In fact, Gen = Gen 0 ). Sign. To sign message m, the signer first invokes Gen 0 (1 k ) to obtain a key pair (pk Key generation of the resulted fully-secure signature P is the same with the key generation of weak signature P 0 . In signature generation phase, Sign 0 (sk, pk 0 ) can be pre-computed by the signer. The construction is similar with [4, 23] . However, it is observed for the first time that only weakly-secure signatures are required here, instead of fully-secure signature scheme [4] or one-time signature scheme as required in [23] .
Below, we formally prove the security of the signature scheme P. We denote the cost of a signing algorithm Sign 0 in P 0 by t sign 0 . Proof. See Appendix B. h
In fact, if the signing algorithm Sign 0 in P 0 deterministic, then the fully-secure signature scheme P is strongly unforgeable.
Parallel composition method
In this section, we show another generic transformation from weakly-secure signatures to fully-secure signatures.
Before showing the transformation, we define a relation R ¼ fðða; bÞ; cÞg that satisfies the following conditions:
Given a and c (or b and c), b (or a) is determined and can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT); Given randomly chosen values a and b, it is hard to find c in PPT, such that ðða; bÞ; cÞ 2 R:
In fact, this kind of relation can be easily found. Suppose the security parameter is 1 k . For example, given a collision-resis-
k and c 2 {0, 1} ⁄ , we define ðða; bÞ; cÞ 2 R, if and only if a È b = H(c). Obviously, this relation satisfies the definition of R because: Given a 2 {0, 1}
k and c, b 2 {0, 1} k is determined and can be computed efficiently; And, randomly choose a 2 {0, 1} k and b 2 {0, 1} k , it is hard to find c such that a È b = H(c) for the collision-resistant property of the hash function.
In public parameters, relation R ¼ fðða; bÞ; cÞg defined above should be given. The generic construction follows:
1. Gen. On input security parameter 1 k , invoke Gen 0 (1 k ) two times and obtain two key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ). Output P 0 s public key pk = (pk 1 , pk 2 ) and secret key sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 ). It is easy to prove that P is strongly unforgeable if P 0 is deterministic. Below, we formally prove the security of the resulting signature scheme P, with very tight security reduction to P 0 . We also denote the cost of a signing algorithm sign Proof. See Appendix C. h
Comparisons
We only compare the efficiency of the last two paradigms, i.e., sequential composition method and parallel composition method, because they are only based on weakly-secure signature scheme.
Key generation phase: The key generation in fully-secure signature from the sequential method, is the same with its corresponding key generation of weak signature scheme. And, for the fully-secure signature from parallel method, it requires to run the key generation algorithm of weak signature twice. So, the key size is smaller and computation cost is less in sequential method, compared with the parallel method. Signing phase: In the first paradigm, the signer should run the key generation algorithm and signing algorithm of weak signature, respectively. In the second paradigm, it requires to run the signing algorithm of weak signature twice. The online computations of both methods in signing phase are the same because it is only required to run signing algorithm of weak signature only once. Verification phase: In both paradigms, it requires to run the verification of weak signature scheme twice. So, the computations of verification algorithm are the same.
In conclusion, the sequential method is more suitable for device with small storage such as smart card for its smaller key size. And, the signing algorithm in the sequential composition method requires one key generation of weak signatures. So, if the computation of this phase is almost the same with signing algorithm of weak signature, then, the sequential method is indeed better than the parallel composition method. Otherwise, from only the computational cost of signing algorithm, the parallel composition method is better. So, we can use different paradigms according to circumstance requirements.
5.
Instantiations from sequential composition method with one-time signature scheme 5.1. Fully-secure signature from weak Boneh-Boyen signature Next, we describe the fully-secure signature from the weakly-secure signature [5] and OTS. We describe how to get fully-secure signature, denoted by S-WBB-OTS, by using the sequential composition method with one-time signature on the weak Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. The public parameters are similar with the weak Boneh-Boyen signature. Let OTS ¼ ðOGen; OSign; OVerifyÞ be a one-time signature. Meanwhile, define a collision-resistant hash function H : f0; 1g
The public key is pk = (g, y) and the secret key is sk = x. Theorem 6. The S-WBB-OTS signature scheme is fully-secure.
Proof. The result can be derived directly from Theorems 1 and 3. h
Notice that the user's public key consists only one group element y in G 1 . So length of the public key is even more shorter than [5] . It requires one point scalar multiplication in G 1 and one-time signature computations in signature generation. In fact, the value A and C can be pre-computed. So the online computation of Sign is only the computation of one-time signature, which is very efficient compared ordinary signature scheme. Verification only requires two pairing computation, one point scalar multiplication in G 1 , and an OTS verification, which is also very efficient. The only disadvantage of this signature scheme is that length of the signature is longer than [5] .
Fully-secure signature from weak GHR signature
In this section, we show the fully-secure signature (denoted by S-WGHR-OTS) from weakly-secure signature [16] and OTS ¼ ðOGen; OSign; OVerifyÞ. Define a hash function H which is collision and division intractable satisfies H : ð0; 1Þ Ã ! Z Ã n .
1. Gen: Pick two safe primes p and q, compute n = pq as RSA modulus, select s 2 Z Ã n . The public key is pk = (n, s) and the secret key is sk = (p, q). Theorem 7. The S-WGHR-OTS signature scheme is fully-secure.
Proof. The result can be derived directly from Theorems 2 and 3. h 6. Instantiations from sequential composition method 6.1. Fully-secure signature from weak Boneh-Boyen signature
We describe how to get fully-secure signature, denoted by S-WBB, by using the sequential composition method on the weak Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. The public parameters are similar with the weak Boneh-Boyen signature, except a collision resistant hash function H :
The public key is y and the secret key is x. In key generation algorithm, S-WBB scheme needs one exponentiation in group G 1 . The signing algorithm costs two exponentiations computations in group G 1 and two inversion computations in Z Ã p . As the value A could be pre-computed, the computations is reduced to only one exponentiation in G 1 and one inversion computation in Z Ã p . In verification algorithm, the valueêðg; gÞ can be fixed and published as part of the public key. So, it only needs two pairing and two exponentiations computations.
Compared with the fully-secure signature scheme in [5] , the key generation algorithm of S-WBB is more efficient. Furthermore, the key size is smaller than [5] because the secret key consists of only one group element. So, it is very suitable for small storage device such as smart card or mobile phone to perform authentication operations. The online computation for signing algorithm in [5] is also one exponentiation in G 1 and one inversion computation in Z Ã p . The computation of online verification in S-WBB requires one more pairing computation compared with [5] . From the above comparison, the S-WBB scheme is very suitable for device with small storage.
Theorem 8. The S-WBB signature scheme is fully-secure.
Proof. The result can be derived directly from Theorems 1 and 4. h 6.2. Fully-secure signature from weak GHR signature
In this section, we present a fully-secure signature, denoted by S-WGHR, from the weak GHR signature scheme [16] .
1. Gen: On input security parameter 1 k , pick two pairs safe primes (p 1 , q 1 ). Compute n 1 = p 1 q 1 as a RSA modulus, select
. Meanwhile, choose a division intractability hash function
. The public key is (n 1 , s 1 , n 2 , s 2 , H 1 ) and the secret key is (p 1 , q 1 ). 2. Sign: To sign a message m, choose two pairs safe primes (p 2 , q 2 ), and a random s 2 2 Z , respectively. Compared to [26] , the computations in signing and verification algorithms are almost the same. In key generation algorithm of S-WGHR, the key size is smaller than [26] and it requires less exponentiations to generate key pair.
Instantiations from parallel composition method
In the following two instantiations, we will use the concrete relation R given in Section 4.3: ðða; bÞ; cÞ 2 R, if and only if a È b = H(c). The relation should be described in system public parameters, in both following examples.
Fully-secure signature from weak Boneh-Boyen signature
Denote the following fully-secure signature scheme from the weak Boneh-Boyen by P-WBB. The public parameters are similar with the weak Boneh-Boyen signature, excluding a concrete relation R given in Section 4.3.
The public key is (y 1 , y 2 ) and the secret key is (x 1 , x 2 ). 2. Sign: Given message m 2 Z In key generation algorithm of P-WBB, it needs two exponentiations in group G 1 . The signing algorithm costs two exponentiations computations in group G 1 and two inversion computations in Z Ã p . In verification algorithm, it only needs two pairing and two exponentiations computations as the valueêðg; gÞ can be published as part of the public key.
From Theorems 1 and 5, we can get the following result:
Theorem 10. The P-WBB signature scheme is fully-secure. The security reduction is the same with Theorem 5.
Fully-secure signature from weak GHR signature
In this section, we present a fully-secure signature, denoted by P-WGHR, from the weak GHR signature [16] with the following advantages: The new scheme does not require the non-standard randomness-finding oracle assumption. The signing algorithm requires less exponentials computation compared to [16] k and computes the signature as r = (A, B, C) , where , respectively. It is very interesting because this instantiation from the weak GHR signature scheme looks similar to the twin signature scheme in [26] . In fact, the parallel composition paradigm could be viewed as generalization of [26] . First, we define a relation R as follows:
ða; bÞ; c 2 R if and only if a = c È l 1 kc È l 2 , b = l 1 kl 2 for some l 1 and l 2 .
It is easy to verify such kind of relation satisfies the definition given in Section 4.3. Based on this given relation and the parallel paradigm, the twin signature scheme [26] could be derived directly from the weak GHR signature scheme.
And, the following result could be derived easily from Theorems 2 and 5. And, security reduction is the same with Theorem 5.
Theorem 11. The P-WGHR signature scheme is fully-secure.
Conclusion
Three new paradigms are proposed to obtain fully-secure signature scheme from any scheme satisfies only a weak security notion called existentially unforgeable against generic chosen message attacks. The sequential composition (with one-time signature) methods are very efficient in key generation algorithm compared to the parallel composition method. However, if the computation cost in the key generation algorithm of weak signature needs more than the weak signature's signing algorithm, then, the signing algorithm is more efficient in the parallel paradigm. Therefore, different paradigm can be adopted in applications according to different requirements.
We also present several instantiations which are converted from two previous weakly-secure signature schemes and are fully-secure without random oracles. The comparisons with the previous secure signatures show that our paradigms are very efficient.
There are two types of forgeries. The reduction works differently for each forger type. Therefore, initially A 0 will choose a random bit b code 2 {1, 2} that indicates its guess for the type of forger that A will emulate. Forgery. After the signature queries, A outputs a forged signature on a new message m
, where C ⁄ = C i for some 1 6 i 6 q.
If i -j; A 0 aborts and fails. Otherwise, if i = j, then c ⁄ = pk ⁄ . This implies that A 0 can output a forged signature B ⁄ on a new message m ⁄ with respect to pk ⁄ and break the signature scheme P 0 .
We define two events, E 1 and E 2 , which denotes type 1 forgery and type 2 forgery occurs, respectively. As prob½E 1 þ prob½E 2 ¼ prob½A wins. Since A wins with probability e, it follows that one of the two events occurs with probability at least e/2. It is easy to see that the success probability of A 0 under the conditions that event E 1 occurs is Proof. Given any adversary A attacking P in an adaptive chosen message attack, we construct an adversary A 0 breaking P 0 in weak chosen message attacks. After given public key pk of P; A queries the signing oracle of P on messages m i adaptively and gets q signatures r i = (A i , B i , C i ) for 1 6 i 6 q. After the signature queries, A outputs a forged signature on a new m
There are also two types of forgeries:
Type 1 forgery: C ⁄ -C i for 1 6 i 6 q. Type 2 forgery: C ⁄ = C i for some i, 1 6 i 6 q.
The reduction works differently for each forger type. Therefore, initially A 0 will choose a random bit b code 2 {1, 2} that indicates its guess for the type of forger that A will emulate , with respect to pk, for 1 6 i 6 q. Then A 0 sets the public key of P as pk = (pk 1 , pk 2 ), where pk 2 ¼ pk, and sends the public key pk to the adversary A. i from the second property of the defined relation R. This proof, in fact, shows that the signature scheme prevents the attack from the adversary that just combine the first part in one signature for message M and the second part in the other signature for message M 0 .
So, A 0 can output a forged P 0 signature as r = A ⁄ on a new message m Ã 00 and break the signature scheme P 0 , with respect to the challenge public key pk. h
